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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the district court was correct in holding that one cannot obtain 
property from the County through either adverse possession or the related doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. 
II. Whether the district court was correct in holding that a strip of land owned 
by the public could not be vacated or abandoned through disuse alone? 
III. Whether the district court was correct in ruling that Jamie Fries was entitled 
to ownership in the alleyway, where Jamie Fries' predecessor in interest owned the real 
property from which the entire alley came, where Ms. Fries predecessor in interest had 
dedicated the alley for public use, where Ms. Fries predecessor in interest platted the 
alley as part of the Highland Subdivision, and where Ms. Fries' lot is in the Highland 
Subdivision while Ms. Myers' lot is not. 
IV. Whether the district court was correct in ruling that there were no genuine 
issues of material fact. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-807 (2000) [now § 10-9a-607(l)]: 
(1) Plats, when made, acknowledged, and recorded according to the 
procedures specified in this part, operate as a dedication of all streets and 
other public places, and vest the fee of those parcels of land in the 
municipality for the public for the uses named or intended in those plats 
(2) The dedication established by this section does not impose liability 
upon the municipality for streets and other public places that are dedicated 
in the manner but unimproved. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105 (1998): 
All public highways once established shall continue to be highways until 
abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having 
jurisdiction over any highway, or by other competent authority. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-13 (1953): 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands 
held by any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, 
designated for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public 
squares, or for any other public purpose, by adverse possession for any 
length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affirmatively appear that such 
town or city or county or the corporate authorities thereof have sold, or 
otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a 
valuable consideration, and that for more than seven years subsequent to 
such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or successors in interest, have 
been in the exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such real 
estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The disputed tract of land in this case is the portion of an alley that runs between 
the parties' property (hereinafter, the "alley" or "alleyway"). Prior to 1916, Ms. Fries' 
predecessor in interest owned the land (now known as the "Highland Subdivision") that 
included the alley. In 1916, Ms. Fries' predecessor in interest dedicated the alley to the 
public, and divided the Highland Subdivision into individual lots. In the year 2000, Salt 
Lake County vacated the alley. A dispute between the parties arose over who owned the 
alley. Ms. Myers asserted ownership on the grounds that she had been possessing the 
alley and had therefore adversely possessed the alley from the County. Ms. Fries asserted 
ownership on the grounds that the alley was part of the Highland subdivision (which Ms. 
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Fries lot was in and Ms. Myers lot was not), and because Ms. Fries predecessor in interest 
owned the property and was the one that had dedicated the alley to the public. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the District Court 
On April 7, 2004, Ms. Fries filed her Complaint, seeking an order quieting title in 
her name to the alley. On September 13, 2004, Ms. Fries moved for Summary Judgment. 
On December 6, 2004, the district court heard Ms. Fries Motion for Summary Judgment. 
At the hearing, the district court accepted all of Ms. Myers' facts as true, but held that 
they made no difference. Specifically, the district court held that the only way the alley 
could cease to be the property of the County was by formal vacation, and that there could 
be no adverse possession or boundary by acquiescence against the County regardless of 
whether the entire alley had been fenced off for fifty years or even more. The district 
court ruled that Ms. Fries was the rightful owner. On January 4, 2005, Judge Anthony B. 
Quinn of the Third Judicial District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Ms. 
Fries. Ms Myers filed her notice of appeal on January 5, 2005. 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. Ms. Fries owns real property located in Magna, Utah (3036 South 9050), 
identified as lots 9, 10, and 11, section 257, of Salt Lake County's Plat Map,ffice Book G 
of Plats, Page 67. (R. at 4.; a copy of said plat is attached as Exhibit A and enlarged copy 
of portion of plat as Exhibit B.) 
2. Ms. Myers owns real property to the west of Ms. Fries (9100 West, Magna, 
Utah), identifies as lot 004, section 257, of Salt Lake County's Plat Map, Office Book G 
of Plats, Page 67. (R. at 4, 58; Exhibit A and B.) 
3 
3. Between the parties' property lays a twelve foot wide alley that runs north 
and south from 3000 South to 3100 South at 9075 West. (R. at 5, 6, 9,11; Exhibit A and 
B). 
4. Prior to 1916, Ms. Fries' predecessor in interest owned land (now known as 
the "Highland Subdivision") that included the alley. In 1916, Ms. Fries' predecessor in 
interest dedicated the alley to the public, and divided the Highland Subdivision into 
individual lots. (R. at 89; a copy, reduced in size, of portions of the Highland 
Subdivision Dedication are attached as Exhibit C). 
5. The entire alley remained in the Highland subdivision. (R. at 5, 89, 95; 
Exhibit A, and B.) 
6. Ms. Fries' lot is in the Highland subdivision while Ms. Myers' lot is not. 
(R. at 5, 89, 95; Exhibit A, and B.) 
7. On September 18, 2000, Salt Lake County vacated the alley by ordinance 
no. 1467. (R. at 11-16; A copy of the Ordinance is attached as Exhibit D.) 
8. The Salt Lake County tax assessor added the alley to the lot owners on the 
east side of the alley (i.e., those lots within the Highland Subdivision, including Ms. Fries 
lot), and did not add the portion to the lot owners on the west side of the alley (i.e., those 
lots not within the Highland Subdivision, including Ms. Myers' lot). (R. at 90, 102, 106.) 
9. Despite Salt Lake County's ordinance, and Salt Lake County Tax 
assessment, Appellant Ms. Myers refused to vacate the alley. Instead, she claimed she 
had been possessing the alley and was therefore the rightful owner by adverse possession. 
(R. at 24-30.) 
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10. On April 7, 2004, Ms. Fries filed a Complaint, seeking an order quieting 
title in her name to the alley. As part of her Complaint, Ms. Fries asserted ownership on 
the grounds that her predecessor in interest owned the property and was the one that had 
dedicated the alley to the public, and because the alley was platted as part of the Highland 
subdivision (which Ms. Fries lot was in and Ms. Myers lot was not). (R. at 1-2.) 
11. On September 13, 2004, Ms. Fries moved for Summary Judgment (R. at 
31) claiming that Ms. Myers could not adversely possess property from the County prior 
to 2000, and that not enough time had passed to allow Ms. Myers to adversely possess the 
property against Ms. Fries. (R. at 31, 91-92.) 
12. On December 6, 2004, the district court heard Ms. Fries Motion for 
Summary Judgment. For purposes of summary judgment, the district court accepted all 
of Ms. Myers' facts as true including her claim that the entire alley had been fenced off 
and was part of the defendant's properties for a long period of time, at least since the 
1950s. (R. at 248, Transcr. Hrg. 33:25, 34:10-13.) 
13. The district court held that Ms. Myers' facts made no difference because 
the law was clear that the County could only vacate the property by formal vacation, and 
that Ms. Myers could not obtain ownership by adversely possessing property against the 
County. Since Ms. Fries predecessor in interest had owned the entire alley, and had 
platted all of it as part of the Highland subdivision, Ms. Fries was the rightful owner. (R. 
at 248, Transcr. Hrg. 32:23-25, 33:1-13.) 
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14. On January 4, 2005, Judge Anthony B. Quinn entered an order granting Ms. 
Fries' Motion for Summary Judgment and quieting title to the alley to Ms. Fries. (R. at 
216-17.) 
15. On January 5, 2005, Ms. Myers filed her Notice of Appeal. (R. at 219-21.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The district court was correct in ruling, on summary judgment, that Ms. Myers 
could not have acquired the alley through adverse possession or boundary by 
acquiescence. The law is clear that one cannot adversely possess property from the state. 
Ms. Myers' argument that she and her predecessors have been in open, notorious, and 
adverse possession of the alley are therefore irrelevant. 
The alley could not cease to be property of the County except by formal vacation. 
Ms. Myers argument that the County abandoned the property over fifty years ago is also 
without merit because the County did not formerly vacate the property until September 
18,2000. 
Ms. Fries is entitled to ownership of the entire alley that abutted her property 
because her predecessor in interest owned the alley, and the alley was dedicated as part of 
Ms. Fries' subdivision. By operation of law, the alley reverted back to the original 
owner's successor in interest. Ms. Myer's argument that the alley should be split XA is 
without merit because § 72-5-105(2)(a), which Ms. Myers relies upon, was not in effect 
until 2002 (two years after the county's vacation). Furthermore, § 72-5-105(2)(b) 
provides for exclusive ownership when an owner of record is known. In this case, the 
undisputed evidence showed that Ms. Fries' predecessor in interest owned the alley. 
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Property vacated by the County should therefore be awarded to the original owner's 
successors in interest. Ms. Myers predecessor in interest did not own the alley, and her 
lot was not platted as part of the Highland Subdivision that included the alley. Thus, Ms. 
Myers had no claim of ownership in the vacated alley. 
The district court was correct in holding that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact. Facts about the County abandoning the alley are irrelevant because the 
County cannot cease its ownership right except by formal vacation. Facts about 
acquiring the alley through adverse possession are similarly irrelevant because one 
cannot adversely possess property from the County. Thus, the district court's order 
granting summary judgment was correct and should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT MS. 
MYERS COULD NOT HAVE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP THROUGH 
ADVERSE POSSESSION OR BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
A. One cannot adversely possess property from the County. 
The Appellant's claim that the County abandoned the property is wholly without 
merit. The unambiguous language of the Utah Code provides: 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or title in or to any lands held by 
any town, city or county, or the corporate authorities thereof, designated for public 
use as streets, lanes, avenues, alleys, parks or public squares, or for any other 
public purpose, by adverse possession for any length of time whatsoever, unless it 
shall affirmatively appear that such town or city or county or the corporate 
authorities thereof have sold, or otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real 
estate to a purchaser for a valuable consideration, and that for more than seven 
years subsequent to such conveyance the purchaser, his grantees or successors in 
interest, have been in the exclusive, continuous and adverse possession of such 
real estate; in which case an adverse title may be acquired. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
12-13(1953). 
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In this case, there is no evidence given by the Appellant that the County sold, or 
otherwise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to a purchaser for a valuable 
consideration. 
In Nyman v. Anchor Development, 73 P.3d 357, 360 (Utah 2003), the appellant 
requested quiet title to a strip of land (vacated by the state) because his garage (for which 
he paid taxes) had been on the strip of land for twenty-four years. However, the Supreme 
Court of Utah rejected his argument because one may not adverse the sovereign. See also 
Cassity v. Castagno, 347 P. 2d 834 (Utah 1959); Lund v. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33 
(Utah 1908). Because one cannot obtain property from the state through fences, or 
occupancy, the Nyman Court rejected the appellant's claim to ownership and affirmed the 
trial court's summary judgment. 
Similarly, in this case, Ms. Myers is trying to claim ownership of the property 
through the establishment offences or other boundary devices. Since one may not 
adverse the sovereign, Ms. Myers has no claim to ownership through adverse possession. 
B. One cannot acquire ownership against the County through boundary 
by acquiescence. 
Ms. Myers has also asserted ownership through boundary by acquiescence. (See 
Brief of Appellant 10, fn. 2.) Much like the related doctrine of adverse possession, one 
cannot obtain property from the County through boundary by acquiescence. The 
Supreme Court of Utah held that parties separated by a strip of land (i.e., a street or 
alley) once owned by the county could not claim boundary by acquiescence on any 
8 
portion of that vacated strip of land because the parties had no contiguity. Condas v. 
Willesen, 61A P.2d 115 (Utah 1983). In Condas, 
The appellants and respondents own land in Salt Lake County, which until 1980 
was separated by a 33-foot strip of land. The 33-foot strip had been dedicated as a 
street (St. Johns Street) in 1908 by respondents' predecessors in interest. The 
street was never actually built, and Salt Lake County passed an ordinance vacating 
its ownership of the property in 1980. From approximately 1929 until 1979, a 
fence was located along the eastern edge of St. Johns Street. Appellants and their 
predecessors in interest occupied the land west of the fence, including St. Johns 
Street itself, and respondents and their predecessors in interest occupied the land 
east of the fence. M a t 674. (Emphasis added). 
Essentially, the Condas appellants were claiming that since they had a fence, 
occupied, and used the strip of land for fifty years, they should be entitled to the property. 
The Supreme Court rejected their argument: 
The appellants contend that they have acquired equitable title to the disputed strip 
of property under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. From at least 1929 
until 1979, they or their predecessors in interest occupied and used the property in 
question. The undisputed facts show that St. Johns Street separated the property 
owned by the appellants from that owned by respondents throughout the period 
which appellants claim to have established a boundary by acquiescence. During 
that period of time, Salt Lake County was the fee simple owner of the dedicated 
property. U.C.A., 1953, § 57-5-4. // is therefore obvious that one of the essential 
requirements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence—that the parties be 
'adjoining' landowners—has not been met in this case. Without contiguity there 
can be no boundary by acquiescence. Smith v. DeNiro, 25 Utah 2d 295, 296, 480 
P. 2d 480,481 (1971) (footnote omitted). Appellants' contentions therefore fail 
and the [summary] judgment of the district court was correct. I(L Emphasis 
added. 
The rationale preventing adverse possession and boundary by acquiescence both 
stem from the same doctrine, namely the "'ancient doctrine' of nullum tempus occurrit 
regi, or 'time does not run against the king.' Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A. 2d 199, 
201-02 (N.J. 1991) (explaining the doctrine's rationale that 'the king was too busy 
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protecting the interests of his people to keep track of his lands and to bring suits to 
protect them in a timely fashion')." Nyman v. Anchor Development, 73 P.3d 357, 360 
(Utah 2003). 
II. THE ALLEY COULD CEASE TO BE PROPERTY OF THE COUNTY 
ONLY BY FORMAL VACATION 
The County (or any other sovereign entity) abandons property only by formal 
vacation. See e.g., Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. 
Osguthorpe, 756 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1982); Condas v. Willesen, 674 P.2d 115 (Utah 1983); 
Hallv. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 304, 166 P.2d 221 (Utah 1946); Nyman v. Anchor 
Development, 73 P.3d 357, 360 (Utah 2003); Cassity v. Castagno, 347 P. 2d 834 (Utah 
1959); Lundv. Wilcox, 34 Utah 205, 97 P. 33 (Utah 1908); Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 
592 A. 2d 199, 201-02 (N.J. 1991). 
The foregoing cases dealt with public property that had substantial periods of non-
use by the public (some of them had no use at all), but they all came out the same way; 
namely, property is not abandoned by the state through non-use—only by written order or 
declaration. 
Ercanbrack, laid out the rule that a public roadway could not be abandoned or 
vacated by even decades of disuse, but only by written declaration. Id. at 597. Appellant 
argues that Ercanbrack only applies to property established by "use" from the 
government, and not by "dedication." However, Ercanbrack placed no special 
distinction on such grounds, and is a distinction made only by Appellant Ms. Myers. 
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Henderson eliminates the guess work of whether Ms. Myers' distinction of "use" 
versus "dedication" is significant. In Henderson, the property was "dedicated" as a Salt 
Lake County roadway, but the property "has never been developed as road and remains 
essentially in its natural state, covered by trees and shrubs." Id. at 1268 (Emphasis 
added). Despite the fact that the Henderson road had been dedicated for public use and 
never developed, the court still applied the Ercanbrack rule: "the legislature expressed its 
clear intention not to provide for automatic forfeiture of publicly owned roadways 
through nonuse alone." Henderson at 1269. In other words, Ms. Myers' distinction of 
"use" versus "dedication" is irrelevant. Moreover, the facts in this case are similar to 
Henderson. The alley in this case was dedicated for public use and had a substantial 
period of non-use. As such, this court should follow the same rule as Henderson. 
In another example, adjoining property owners had fenced off a street shown on a 
township plat for more than seventy years before the city decided to open the street. The 
Court held that the right to use the street had not been lost, even after seventy-five years 
of non-use, and that the street could be opened. Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 304, 
166P.2d221 (Utah 1946). 
Appellant Ms. Myers relies heavily on Falula Farms v. Ludlow, 866 P.2d 569 
(Utah 1993), but draws incorrect conclusions about its holdings. Ms. Myers incorrectly 
asserts that if the alley is a defeasible fee, Ms. Fries is not entitled to the alley. Falula 
Farms does not make this holding. The holding in Falula Farms was that the state could 
not choose itself who to give vacated property, but can only vacate and revoke its original 
acceptance so that the property reverts back to the original property owners. The reason 
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Falula Farms emphasized the defeasible fee was because Falula Farms argued that if the 
county did have a fee simple, it could deed the property to whomever it chose. However, 
the court held that the quit claim deed could only serve to revoke its acceptance thereof, 
and that the alley would then revert back to the original owners of the land. Id. at 572. In 
Falula Farms, the roadway was not given up through any inaction of the county, but was 
only vacated as a result of a pro-active action: a written quit claim deed from the county. 
Id. at 573. The court stated that if the road was no longer used by the public, it created a 
condition whereby "it may be abandoned," but does not actually trigger the abandonment 
itself. Id. at 572. The triggering mechanism in Falula Farms was the quit claim deed 
from the county. In essence, the holding of Falula Farms does not diminish the 
Ercanbrack requirement of a written formal declaration of vacation. 
Since the quit claim deed in Falula Farms could only divest the county of its 
interest, the Falula Farms court had to decide who the property should revert to. The 
Court held that the property should revert to the lot purchasers, not the developer. 
The reason vacated roadways go to the lot purchasers (and not the developer) is 
because it is presumed the sale of the lot automatically includes the reversionary interest 
of any public roadway. See, e.g., Weldon v. Heron, 78 N.M. 427, 428,432 P.2d 392, 393 
(1967). 
In this case, Salt Lake County's September 18, 2000 written ordinance vacating 
the alley caused the alley to revert back to the original owner's successors in interest just 
as the written quit claim did the roadway in Falula Farms. Without a written declaration, 
the alley would have not been vacated. 
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III. WHEN THE ALLEY WAS VACATED ON SEPTEMBER 18, 2000, THE 
PORTION OF THE ALLEY THAT ABUTTED MS. FRIES' PROPERTY 
AUTOMATICALLY REVERTED BACK TO HER 
Ms. Fries is entitled to ownership of the entire alley that abutted her property 
because her predecessor in interest owned the alley, and the alley was dedicated as part of 
Ms. Fries' subdivision. The county ordinance vacating the alley stated, "All right, title 
and interest in and to the portion of said alley being vacated is to revert by operation of 
law to the abutting property owner or owners." See Exhibit D. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "revert" as follows: 
Revert. To turn back, to return to. With respect to property, to go back to and 
lodge in former owner, who parted with it by creating estate in another which has 
expired, or to his heirs. As used in a deed, connotes an undisposed of residue and 
imports that property is to return to a person who formerly owned it, but who 
parted with the possession or title by creating an estate in another person which 
has terminated by his act or by operation of law. Black's Law Dictionary 916 
(Abridged 6th ed., West 1991). 
In Condas v. Willesen, 61A P.2d 115 (Utah 1983), the Appellee was the successor 
in interest to the roadway; as such, the Appellant did not even argue for a XA split. Once 
the court rejected Appellants argument of ownership by boundary by acquiescence, the 
court affirmed summary judgment that had quieted title of the entire roadway to the 
Appellee. 
Other states follow the rule that the entire roadway goes to one party so long as 
there is a record of the initial holder of title. State v. Mobile River Telephone Company, 
898 So.2d 763 (Ala. Ct App. 2004). Ms. Myers tries to distinguish this case on the 
grounds that Ms. Fries did not personally own all of the alley when the alley was 
originally platted. This does not distinguish the case because neither did the property 
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owners in Mobile River. The Mobile River appellant's predecessor in interest owned the 
land that included the entire roadway. As a successor in interest to the original owner, 
the Mobile River appellant was entitled to the entire alleyway, and not just half. Id. at 
773-74. 
Mobile River further stated, "It is a fundamental concept in American 
Jurisprudence that a grantee or successor in title cannot obtain more by conveyance than 
the grantor or their predecessor in title possessed." Id. at 768. The court went on to 
explain that it would be "inequitable fiction" to split a vacated highway in half when the 
plaintiff could indisputably show that plaintiffs predecessor in interest was one who 
originally owned and platted the highway for public use. Id. at 773. 
In another illustrative case, Neil v. Independent Realty Co., 317 Mo. 1235, 1244, 
298 S.W. 363, 366 (1927), the plaintiffs' predecessor purchased four contiguous lots on 
the northern side of a subdivision, while defendants' predecessor had purchased four lots 
on the southern side. Later, plaintiffs' predecessor re-subdivided the northern half of the 
original subdivision and laid out a 25 foot wide street as the southernmost edge of the 
subdivision. In other words, the street had been taken from the northern lots. The City 
later vacated the street, and the defendants claimed ownership of half of the roadway, or 
12.5 feet. The trial court granted the entire 25 feet to the plaintiffs, and the Supreme 
Court of Missouri affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 
In this case, the undisputed facts show that Ms. Fries' predecessor in interest 
originally platted the alley. 
14 
Appellant Ms. Myers argues that the roadway should be split Vi between the 
parties and relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105(2) (2002) for her proposition: 
(a) For purposes of assessment, upon the recordation of an order executed by 
the proper authority with the county recorder's office, title to the vacated or 
abandoned highway, street, or road shall vest to the adjoining record owners, with 
1/2 of the width of the highway, street, or road assessed to each of the adjoining 
owners. 
(b) Provided, however, that should a description of an owner of record extend 
into the vacated or abandoned highway, street, or road that portion of the vacated 
or abandoned highway, street, or road shall vest in the record owner, with the 
remainder of the highway, street, or road vested as otherwise provided in this 
Subsection (2). 
There are two problems with Appellant's argument. First, subsection (2) was not 
codified until 2002. Since the alley was vacated in 2000, subsection (2) does not even 
apply. The alley reverted to the abutting land owners in 2000, not 2002. 
Second, even if subsection (2)(a) did apply, subsection (2)(b) explicitly provides 
an exception to the XA split when the record holder of the original roadway is known. In 
this case, it is undisputed that Mr. Papinokolas was the original record holder. It is 
undisputed that Ms. Fries is a successor in interest to Mr. Papinokolas. It is undisputed 
that the alley was platted as part of the Highland Subdivision, where Ms. Mries lot is 
located and Ms. Myers lot is not. As such, when the County vacated the alley in 2000, 
Ms. Fries became the rightful owner of the portion of the alley that abuts her property. 
15 
IV. BECAUSE THE COUNTY COULD NOT CEASE ITS OWNERSHIP 
EXCEPT BY FORMAL VACATION, AND BECAUSE ONE CANNOT 
ADVERSELY POSSESS AGAINST THE SOVEREIGN, THERE WERE 
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
The Defendant could not begin to adversely possess the property before 
September 18, 2000 (the date the county vacated the alley). Whether fence lines had 
been in place for at least 40 years was immaterial. Facts about the county abandoning the 
alley were also irrelevant because the county cannot cease its ownership right except by 
formal vacation. 
Ms. Myers initially made some argument about whether Ms. Fries' undisputed 
publicly known facts had been authenticated. Once all the publicly known facts were 
authenticated, Ms. Myers dropped this argument. Ms. Myers seems to have resurfaced 
this argument in her Appellate Brief. This argument remains without merit because the 
facts are publicly known and have been authenticated. (R. at 89, 93-115.) 
Accordingly, because there were no genuine issues of any material facts, the 
district court was correct in granting summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. One cannot adversely possess 
property from the County, and the County does not cease ownership of property except 
by formal vacation. There are no genuine issues of material fact. Any facts that might be 
material have been authenticated and are public record. Ms. Myers' facts about exclusive 
possession are immaterial because one cannot adversely possess property from the 
County, and not enough time had passed to allow Ms. Myers to adversely possess against 
16 
Ms. Fries. Thus, the district court was correct in granting Appellee summary judgment as 
a matter of law, and this Court should affirm the district court's order granting summary 
judgment. 
Dated this H^day of M U^f^t _, 2006. 
DAY SHELL & LILJENQUIST, L.C. 
JEFFREY L^CITC^EN 
Attorney fbr Appellee/Respondent, 
Jamie Fries 
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CV AN ORDINANCE VACATING AN ALLEY BETWEEN 3000 SOUTH AND 3100 SOUTH AT 
£ ^ 9075 WEST IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH. 
The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County ordains as follows: 
SECTION 1 ( 1 ) A 12 foot wide by 725 foot long alley, located approximately 
between 3000 South and 3100 South at 9075 West, and which is more fully described in Exhibit 
A attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein, is hereby vacated. 
(2) This ordinance is based upon a finding by the Board of County Commissioners 
following a hearing on June 7,2000, that due and proper notice of the hearing to vacate said alley 
was duly given according to law and that no objection was made to said proposed vacation. The 
Board further finds that the County has no present or future need for the alley vacated herein, and 
that vacation of the alley relieves the County from present or future obligations to maintain such 
alley, Therefore, no appraisal nor compensation to the County is required. 
(3) All right, title and interest in and to the portion of said alley being vacated is to 
revert by operation of law to the abutting property owner or owners. This ordinance shall have 
no force or effect to impair any easement or right-of-way for public utilities, holders of existing 
public franchises, water drainage easements, or other such easements, as presently exist under, 
over, or upon the vacated portion of said alley, or as are or may be shown on the official plats 
and records of the County. 
(4) The Salt Lake County Recorder is hereby directed to record this ordinance and 
make the necessary changes on the official plats and records of the County to reflect said CQ 
U> 
ordinance. °D 
7 7 2 1 8 7 7 co 
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SECTION II. This ordinance shall become effective 15 days after the date of its 
enactment and upon one publication in a newspaper in and having general circulation in Salt 
Lake County. 
APPROVED and PASSED this \ g * day of <>on&**>t.<L 2000. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTEST' ti^ '" '", , , , 
.«"-C0(/;'"« 
SaJtEajce County Cleric^cpS^f s>£tv-rv 
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 /** / 
By,,,-/' ^ Z f e 
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By. 
MARY CALLAGHAN / 
ACTING CHAIR, BgARD OF COU COMMISSIONERS 
Commissioner Callaghan voting ^ Av|g " 
Commissioner Overson voting " A^g " 
Commissioner Shurtleff voting A&sev>T 
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EXHIBIT ,TA" 
Said parcel of land situated in the Southwest quarter, of 
the Northeast Quarter of Section 30, Township 1 S, Range 2 W, Salt 
Lake Base & Meridian, described as follows: 
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of HIGHLAND 
SUBDIVISION OF MAGNA as recorded as entry 
#3 60562 in Book G of plats Page 61 and running 
thence N 89°00'E 12.0 feet to the Northwest 
Corner of Lot 1, Block 4 of said Subdivision; 
thence S 0°55'E 725.0 along the East Line of 
the Alley to the Southwest Corner of Lot 29, 
Block 4 of said Subdivision; thence S 89d 00 'W 
12.0 feet to the Southwest Corner of said 
Subdivision; thence N 0°55'W 725 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
Area equals 8700 sg. ft. or 0.1997 acres. 
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OJ AN ORDINANCE VACATING AN ALLEY BETWEEN 3000 SOUTH AND 3100 SOUTH AT 
^ 9075 WEST IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH. 
The Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County ordains as follows: 
SECTION I (1) A 12 foot wide by 725 foot long alley, located approximately 
between 3000 South and 3100 South at 9075 West, and which is more fully described in Exhibit 
A attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein, is hereby vacated. 
(2) This ordinance is based upon a finding by the Board of County Commissioners 
following a hearing on June 7,2000, that due and proper notice of the hearing to vacate said alley 
was duly given according to law and that no objection was made to said proposed vacation. The 
Board further finds that the County has no present or future need for the alley vacated herein, and 
that vacation of the alley relieves the County from present or future obligations to maintain such 
alley, Therefore, no appraisal nor compensation to the County is required. 
(3) All right, title and interest in and to the portion of said alley being vacated is to 
revert by operation of law to the abutting property owner or owners. This ordinance shall have 
no force or effect to impair any easement or right-of-way for public utilities, holders of existing 
public franchises, water drainage easements, or other such easements, as presently exist under, 
over, or upon the vacated portion of said alley, or as are or may be shown on the official plats 
and records of the County. 
(4) The Salt Lake County Recorder is hereby directed to record this ordinance and 
make the necessary changes on the official plats and records of the County to reflect said 
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SECTION II. This ordinance shall become effective 15 days after the date of its 
enactment and upon one publication in a newspaper in and having general circulation in Salt 
Lake County. 
APPROVED and PASSED this \ g * day of j,Qrt&*<!>t.^ 2000. 
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ATTEST:
 t 0 /,„, 
Salt'Eajke County Cleri^-.Cj4Disf I X S I ^ T U 
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EXHIBIT ,TA" 
Said parcel of land situated in the Southwest quarter, of 
the Northeast Quarter of Section 30, Township 1 S, Range 2 W, Salt 
Lake Base & Meridian, described as follows: 
Beginning at the Northwest Corner of HIGHLAND 
SUBDIVISION OF MAGNA as recorded as entry 
#3 60562 in Book G of plats Page 67 and running 
thence N 89°00'E 12.0 feet to the Northwest 
Corner of Lot 1, Block 4 of said Subdivision; 
thence S '0°55'E 725.0 along the East Line of 
the Alley to the Southwest Corner of Lot 29, 
Block 4 of said Subdivision; thence S 89d 00 'W 
12.0 feet to the Southwest Corner of said 
Subdivision; thence N 0°55'W 725 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
Area equals 8700 sg. ft. or 0.1997 acres. 
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